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LEGAL CRITERIA OF DAMAGES AND BENEFITS-
THE MEASUREMENT OF TAKING-CAUSED
DAMAGES TO UNTAKEN PROPERTY*
Albert Tate, Jr.**
Whether they be called "severance" damages or "consequen-
tial" damages,' compensable injuries are sometimes caused to
property not itself taken by a taking of other property. The
present discussion will concentrate on damages caused by par-
tial takings and the legal criteria in Louisiana for measuring
such damages.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The present Louisiana Constitution provides in pertinent
part " . . . private property shall not be taken or damaged
except for public purposes and after just and adequate com-
pensation is paid."' 2 (Emphasis added.) Every Louisiana con-
stitution since that of 1879 has had similar provisions.
Certain provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code and Revised
Statutes regulate "general" expropriation proceedings 3-those not
made pursuant to a special authorization-such as the highway
department "quick-taking" statute.4 These general provisions
contain no specific reference to severance damages. However,
the Louisiana courts since 1889 have compensated for damages
according to a "before and after" test.5
* A paper delivered at the seminar on expropriation, "The Theory of
Damages," sponsored by Louisiana Chapter No. 43, American Right of Way
Association, in New Orleans, May 15, 1970.
** Associate Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana. The writer acknowl-
edges the research and editorial assistance of David E. Soileau, law clerk
to the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, 1969-1970, and member of
the Calcasieu and Evangeline Parish bars.
1. Technically, severance damages arise only from a partial taking.
"Consequential damages" is a broader term which includes all recoverable
damages to untaken property resulting from a taking, whether part of the
land is taken or not. Some writers further limit "consequential" damages
to damages occurring when no part of the subject property is taken. 2 P.
NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.4432 (3d rev. ed. 1953); Comment, 19 LA. L.
REv. 491 (1959). See also International Paper Co. v. United States, 227 F.2d
201 (5th Cir. 1955). In Louisiana, however, the courts indiscriminately use
"consequential damages" as a term referring to both severance damages
and consequential damages in the more limited sense noted. Comment, 19
LA. L. REv. 491-94 (1959).
2. LA. CONST. art. I, § 2. See also Note, 30 LA. L. Rsv. 346 (1970).
3. LA. Civ. CODS arts. 2626-41; LA. R.S. 19:1-14 (1950).
4. LA. R.S. 48:441-60 (1954).
5. McMahon v. St. Louis A. & T. R. R., 41 La. Ann. 827, 829, 6 So. 640,
641 (1889). See also American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Maguire, 219 La. 740, 54
So.2d 4 (1951).
[431)
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Pursuant to special constitutional authorization,6 the state
legislature empowered the highway department to take property
for highway purposes by ex parte orders.7 By this "quick-taking"
statute, the department is required to file a petition in court
accompanied by certain formalities, including an estimate of
"just and adequate compensation for the taking, showing any
estimate of damages as a separate item."8 The department takes
title to the property upon depositing the amount of this estimate
into the registry of the court,9 rather than after final judgment
as in general proceedings.
SUMMARY OF TYPES OF SEVERANCE DAMAGES ALLOWABLE
As summarized by an authoritative study of Louisiana
decisions,'0 severance damages to a remainder caused by a partial
taking have been allowed for four principal reasons:
(1) the deflation of the market value 1 of this remaining
property because of the unattractiveness of the improve-
ment or its permanent interference with the remainder's
convenient use (such as the construction of a railway across
plantation property);
(2) the deflation of the market value of the remainder
because of the fear, unfounded or not, of subsequent injury
or danger by reason of the taker's use of the acquired por-
tion (such as in the construction of an oil or gas pipeline
across subdivision property);
(3) the deflation or destruction of the plot value of the
parent tract by reason of the acquisition of a part (such as
where the best subdivision use of the land is interfered
with or where the taking leaves insignificant separated
areas) ;
6. LA. CONST. art VI, § 19.1 (added 1948).
7. LA. R.S. 48:441-60 (1954).
8. LA. R.S. 48:442 (1954).
9. LA. R.S. 48:445 (1954).
10. Comment, 19 LA. L. Rsv. 491, 494-95 (1959).
11. "Market value" Is usually referred to as the theoretical price which
should be agreed upon at a voluntary sale between a willing seller and a
willing buyer. See, e.g., State v. Central Realty Inv. Co., 238 La. 965, 117
So.2d 261 (1960). The value is that possessed by the property without ac-
cording any increase that may result from the contemplated improvement.
LA. CIv. CODE art. 2633; LA. R.S. 19:9 (1950); State v. Chadick, 226 La. 367,
76 So.2d 398 (1954). But it does take into consideration all the uses to which
the property may be reasonably adapted, f.e., the highest and best use of
the land in the light of the reasonable expectations of the market place.
Parish of Iberia v. Cook, 238 La. 697, 116 So.2d 491 (1959).
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(4) the "cost-to-cure" expenses incurred by the owner
of the remainder in adjusting his estate to the taker's
occupation of the taken portion (such as relocation of fences
or bridging).
INCIDENTAL OR SPECULATIVE DAMAGES
Some types of losses sustained by landowners because of a
taking have been characterized by the courts as mere "incidental"
damages which are held not compensable. Instead, the cost of
such damages is to be borne by the property owner as part
of the price that every citizen in an organized society must pay
to maintain and improve that society.12 So, in the absence of an
effect on market value, a landowner is not entitled to com-
pensation for diversion of traffic, loss of street parking, narrow-
ing of streets, inconveniences of ingress and egress, loss of
business and goodwill, moving costs, and mental suffering.18
Further, a landowner is not entitled to recover damages
which are regarded as merely speculative. Thus, in several cases,
severance damages were sought on the basis of the alleged loss
of value of property for some special purpose, such as a shopping
center,14 medical and drugstore offices, and facilities opposite a
hospital.15 Such determinations largely involve value judgments
by the court as to whether the contemplated improvements are
really too remote to be compensable or whether they really do
represent a reasonably foreseeable and practical use of the land
which actually affords an increment to present market value.
FORMULAS FOR VALUATION OF DAMAGES
The 1889 decision which first established the "before and
after" test stated that, "in the case of damages the measure of
compensation is the diminution in the value of the [remaining]
property" caused by the taking. 6 In late 1969, the Supreme
Court of Louisiana rendered what may prove to be a leading
decision on the question of the correct method to compute
severance damages, State, Dep't of Highways v. Mason.17 A strip
12. The classic Louisiana declaration to this effect is found In McMahon
v. St. Louis A. & T. R. R., 41 La. Ann. 827, 6 So. 640 (1889).
13. Comment, 19 LA. L. Rsv. 491, 496-98 (1959).
14. State v. Hub Realty Co., 239 La. 154, 118 So.2d 864 (1960).
15. Parish of Iberia v. Cook, 238 La. 697, 116 So.2d 491 (1959).
16. McMahon v. St. Louis A. & T. R. R., 41 La. Ann. 827, 830, 6 So. 640,
641 (1889).
17. 254 La. 1035, 229 So.2d 89 (1969).
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ten feet wide by 550 feet long was taken from a two and one-
half acre service station, cafe, and lounge site to widen a two-
lane highway into four lanes. The result was destruction of some
parking space and one of the two gasoline pump islands at the
service station site. The trial court's award for the value of the
land and the "cost-to-cure" by relocating the pump island was
approved. However, both the supreme court and the court of
appeal18 disallowed much of the severance damages awarded.
The trial court had valued severance damages based upon the
alleged loss of income from certain rental units attributed
to the reduced parking space through loss of the outside ten-
foot strip.
As did the trial court, the supreme court specifically rejected
the claim of the landowner for the cost of demolishing and
reconstructing the service station property to provide space to
restore the identical two pump islands and four traffic lanes
available to the service station. The court specifically held the
so-called "cost-to-cure" concept inappropriate, remarking:
"It is well settled in our jurisprudence that the damages
allowable under Section 2 of Article 1 of the Constitution
of 1921, resulting from expropriation of property rights is
the difference between the market value of the property
for sale or rental purposes immediately before and imme-
diately after the expropriation." 9
Then the court, citing from Nichols on Eminent Domain, sum-
marized the "before and after" rule as follows:
"... the measure of compensation when part of a tract
is taken is the difference between the fair market value
of the whole tract before the taking and the fair market
value of what remains after the taking.' "20 (Emphasis
added.)
The court concluded:
"If . . . the ['cost to cure'] approach has relevance to the
measure of [severance] damages, it should only be em-
ployed to demonstrate a diminution in market value result-
ing from the partial taking .... save.., in special instances
18. 218 So.2d 329 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969).
19. 254 La. 1035, 1043, 229 So.2d 89, 92 (1969).
20. id. at 1045, 229 So.2d at 93. This version of the "before and after"
rule is critically analyzed at pp. 440-43, infra.
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where the ascertainment of market value of the facility
is not available. '21
In Mason, the Supreme Court of Louisiana noted that costs
of moving or relocating, being regarded as an injury without
legal redress, are not generally recoverable as consequential
damages. Replacement costs of a building or other facility may
be considered, but only as a factor directly affecting the reduc-
tion in market value as a result of the partial taking. Neverthe-
less, the supreme court expressly approved the recovery of $4,803
for relocating the gas pumps that had been on the strip taken-
the "cost-to-cure" their loss because of the expropriation of the
land upon which this portion of the facilities was located-
but apparently the highway department had admitted that the
landowner was entitled to recover this item as "consequential"
damages.
Despite the apparent conflict with the rationale limiting
severance damages to diminution in market value only, the
allowance of "cost-to-cure" defects in the property resulting
from the occupation of the acquired portion by the taker is in
line with many similar awards.22 Thus, for instance, the cost
of constructing culverts to retain for a tract its rail access and
availability for industrial purposes28 has been allowed as sever-
ance damages, as has the cost of constructing a spur line to
industrial property severed from the main railroad by the taking
of a service line parallel to the railway track.24
This latest formula reiterated by the Supreme Court of
Louisiana in Mason is not necessarily accurate in all instances.
As noted, the supreme court based the measure of compensa-
tion under the "before and after" rule on the difference between
the fair market value of the entire tract before the taking and
the market value of the remainder after the taking. But this is
not an accurate statement of the Louisiana rule. Louisiana
statutory law prohibits the deduction from any award for the
property actually taken of "any amount for the benefit derived
by the owner from the contemplated improvement or work."2 5
The statutory prohibition, of course, applies only to deducting
benefits from the award for the taking itself; the deduction of
21. 254 La. 1035, 1046, 229 So.2d 89, 93 (1969).
22. Comment, 19 LA. L. REv. 491, 495 n. 22 (1959).
23. Gravity Drainage Dist. No. 1 v. Key, 234 La. 201, 99 So.2d 82 (1958).
24. State v. Williams, 131 So.2d 600 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
25. LA. Crv. Cova art. 2633; LA. R.S. 19:9 (1950).
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special benefits from severance damages otherwise allowable is
sanctioned by our jurisprudence, even though such benefits can-
not offset the award for the taking itself.28
For Louisiana purposes, an undoubtedly more accurate state-
ment of the rule for measuring severance damages is set forth
in a leading 1960 decision: "The difference between the market
value of the remaining property immediately before and its
market value immediately after the expropriation."' ' Insofar
as determining the severance damages as of the date of the
taking, of course, this refers to general expropriation cases, and
not highway "quick-takings," where severance damages by
statute are calculated as of the date of the trial.2
Nevertheless, where the remainder receives no special bene-
fits, the Mason formula of valuing the whole before the taking,
and then deducting the value of the remainder after the taking,
in order to determine the landowner's total award for the taking
and for severance damages, is both an accurate and realistic
method of arriving at the landowner's award. Further, in the
event of immediately successive takings, the Mason test pro-
vides a check against overlooking items of severance damages
properly allowable to the landowner. For instance, two 1960
takings from the same tract were just five days apart. The
first took an eighteen-acre strip for a controlled access highway,
substantially reducing the per-acre value (by $130 per acre) of
the property north of the taking, to which access was now
destroyed. In the second taking, the highway department took
about seventy acres of land for a borrow pit, but attempted to
pay for it at the reduced value which had resulted from the
first taking. Using the entire-tract-minus-value-of-remainder
approach, the court rejected the department's approach by which
the landowners would have been deprived of $9,000 of pre-taking
value of the property merely because of the sequence of the
takings.29
SPECIAL AND GENERAL BENEFITS
Louisiana jurisprudence has established the general principle
that recovery for severance damages to a remainder caused
26. See the discussion of special and general benefits, pp. 436-40, infra.
27. State v. Hub Realty Co., 239 La. 154, 169, 118 So.2d 364, 370 (1960).
28. See the discussion of date of valuation problems, pp. 440-43, infra.
29. State v. Davis, 149 So.2d 164 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
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by a taking may be offset by any special benefits the remainder
receives as a consequence of the new improvements for which
the property is taken. 0 (As earlier noted, these benefits are
not available as a deduction against the award for the property
actually taken.) Nevertheless, general benefits received by all
property in the neighborhood may not be used to offset severance
damages.3 '
The underlying reason for the refusal to offset damages by
general benefits is that a citizen whose property is taken should
not bear more of the cost of the public improvements than
other property owners whose property is neither taken nor
damaged.82 The underlying reason for permitting special bene-
fits to offset severance damages has been placed on the equitable
principle of preventing unjust enrichment, 8 as well as on the
simple mathematical fact that one is not "damaged" to the
extent that the resultant benefit offsets a taking-caused loss.
The real difficulty is in determining which are "general"
benefits not available as an offset and which are "special" bene-
fits. A leading treatise on eminent domain has stated that there
is a greater diversity of opinion and more different and incon-
sistent rules on the question of set-off for benefits than on any
other point in the law of expropriations.
8 4
In 1941, in Louisiana Highway Commission v. Grey,8 the
Supreme Court of Louisiana made perhaps its most definite state-
ment on the question: "General benefits are those which are
shared alike by all property owners in the neighborhood or
community."8 6 On the other hand: " . . . peculiar or special
benefits [are] those affecting a particular estate by reason of its
direct relationship with the improvement."'
In the Grey case, a new road cut diagonally across a 172-
acre farm tract. The severance resulted in a loss of value of
30. State v. Central Realty Inv. Co., 288 La. 965, 117 So.2d 261 (1960);
Thomas & Warner v. City of New Orleans, 230 La. 1024, 89 So.2d 885 (1956);
State v. Cooper, 213 La. 1016, 36 So.2d 22 (1948); Louisiana Highway Comm'n
v. Grey, 197 La. 942, 2 So.2d 654 (1941).
31. City of New Orleans v. Giraud, 238 La. 278, 115 So.2d 349 (1959);
Louisiana Highway Comm'n v. Hoell, 174 La. 302, 140 So. 485 (1932).
32. Louisiana Highway Comm'n v. Grey, 197 La. 942, 2 So.2d 654 (1941).
33. Vicksburg, S. & T. R. R. v. Calderwood, 15 La. Ann. 481 (1860).
34. 3 P. NicHoLs, EMINENT DOMAIN § 8.62 (3d rev. ed. 1965).
35. 197 La. 942, 2 So.2d 654 (1941).
36. Id. at 961, 2 So.2d at 660.
37. Id.
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the land as farm unit, but the evidence showed that the value
of land fronting on the new highway was enhanced. The supreme
court held that this particular enhanced value was not shared
by the community generally and hence was a "special" benefit
which could be used to offset the severance damage caused to
the land's farm value. This 1941 decision referred with approval
to a prior 1932 decision of the same court, Louisiana Highway
Commission v. HoelU.88 There, an increase in valuation result-
ing from highway construction was held to be a general benefit
not available as an offset to the severance damages. In Hoell,
a similar farm tract of 320 acres was diagonally bisected by a
new highway. The supreme court approved the trial court's
refusal to charge the jury that severance damages should be
offset by any general benefit or advantage received by the
property. In this case the general benefit was the advantage
that resulted generally to all of the owners of land adjacent to
or near the new highway. The court held that "general enhance-
ment of value of property" in the vicinity was not available as
an offset.39
It may be instructive to compare the facts in Grey, in which
the increase in value was held a special benefit (and thus offset
against other severance damages), with those in Hoell, in which
the general increase in value resulting from the improvement
was held a general benefit (and thus was not offset). In Grey,
the increase in value of the farm tract, which was near the city,
essentially resulted because as a direct consequence of the
improvement, a better use of the land was available. There
was a present market value for small, road-frontage tracts
located near the city, which could have been sold at higher
per-acre value than could the previously isolated farm acreage.
On the other hand, in Hoell, all of the land in the vicinity,
whether fronting on the highway or not, increased in value
because of the greater accessibility resulting from the modern
highway improvement. In the one case, it was held the land
received some special or peculiar benefit because of the direct
relationship of the land to the highway improvement. In the
other, an enhancement in value of all of the land in the vicinity
because of the highway project-whether the land fronted on
the highway project or not-was held to be a general, not a
special, benefit.
38. 174 La. 302, 140 So. 485 (1932).
39. Id, at 307, 140 So. at 486.
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It does not follow that a benefit is general merely because
it is enjoyed by many other tracts contiguous to the same im-
provement. As the Grey case among many others held, the
benefits are no less direct and special to the subject tract because
other lands on the same street are benefited in a similar manner,
even though the valuation is to a greater or lesser degree with
each and every lot upon the same street. Thus, where there is
a special benefit in being newly situated near an interstate
interchange, it is a special benefit to each particular tract so
newly located as to be able to take peculiar advantage of the
interchange, even though that tract immediately next to the
exit may have a greater special benefit than that one 300 feet
further away.
In the writer's opinion, the benefit derived from, for example,
an interstate interchange should thus be a special new value of
land because of its relationship to the interstate exit, such
as its now-availability for enhanced-value service stations or
motel property, compared to its former value as farmland or
country store property. But, if the evidence does not show any
peculiar or special increment in value because of the inter-
change, such as a greater market value for sale for some use
it did not possess before, then the general increase of value of
all property in the neighborhood because of the interstate exit
is a general benefit shared by all property in the area.
40
The increase of value of all land near an interstate inter-
change due to increased accessibility to urban centers by quick
transit is thus a general not a special benefit, because all property
within a reasonable distance of the highway thus appreciates
whether part of it is taken for the project or not. This may be
proved by showing that since the building of the highway, all
land in the general area, including land not located on the
interstate or its access highways, has increased in value more
than lands outside that general area. But, if because of its
location near the new interstate highway, property increases in
value at a rate greater than that of properties benefiting gen-
erally, for example, if property fronting on the highway be-
comes more attractive commercially, this may be a special
benefit. The extent of special benefits depends on many factors.
For example, land at an interstate highway interchange will be
40. See, e.g., State v. William T. Burton Indus., Inc., 219 So.2d 837 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1969).
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benefited depending on the location of the interchange with
respect to population centers, competing sites at the same or a
nearby interchange, the location of the property within the
interchanges, the volume of traffic on both highways concerned,
the position of the property with respect to the exit ramp, and
the visibility of the property from the interstate highway.41
As a leading treatise on eminent domain summarizes: "The
most satisfactory distinction between general and special bene-
fits is that general benefits are those which arise from the
fulfillment of the public object which justified the taking, and
special benefits are those which arise from the particular rela-
tionship of the land in question to the public improvement." 42
DATE OF VALUATION
In general expropriation proceedings the jurisprudence has,
in the absence of precise statutory regulation, evolved the rule
that both severance damages and the valuation of the property
actually taken are to be fixed as of the date the expropriation
suit is filed, and not as of some indeterminate time in the future
(as, for instance, the date the improvement is completed or the
date the judgment permits the taking after trial).4 Severance
damages are said to be determined by the diminution in the
market value of the remainder immediately before and im-
mediately after the expropriation; 4 but where a particular date
has been material, the court has fixed the valuation as of the
date of the filing of the expropriation suit.4 5 Thus, where a first
suit is dismissed for procedural or other reasons, and a second
suit is filed, the value is fixed as of the date of the second suit's
filing.46
In general operation, the loss in market value is determined
as of the date of the filing of the expropriation suit, but we
assume that the improvement for which the taking is made has
been completed as of that date. Special benefits are likewise
41. Id.
42. 3 P. NICHOLs, EMINENT DOMAIN, § 8.6203 (3d rev. ed. 1965).
43. State v. Levy, 242 La. 259, 136 So.2d 35 (1961); Louisiana Power &
Light Co. v. Simmons, 229 La. 165, 85 So.2d 251 (1956); State v. Landry, 219
La. 721, 53 So.2d 908 (1951); Louisiana Highway Comm'n v. DeBouchel, 174
La. 968, 142 So. 142 (1932).
44. City of Alexandria v. Jones, 236 La. 612, 108 So.2d 528 (1959).
45. Bee Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Simmons, 229 La. 165, 85 So.2d
251 (1956).
46. State v. Landry, 219 La. 721, 53 So.2d 908 (1951).
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determined as those which will accrue to the remainder as a
consequence of the new improvement as if it were already
constructed as of the date of filing. (Certainly on the date the
suit is filed, no such benefits have been derived by the remainder,
since in general expropriations no taking is made until after
trial court judgment.)
The highway "quick-taking" statute, however, explicitly pro-
vides that, whether the taking be partial4 7 or of an entire tract,4
the market value of the property expropriated is determined as
of the time of the taking, but the severance damages are assessed
as of the date of the trial. The owner, however, need not file
an answer demanding severance damages until one year after
final completion and acceptance of the highway project for
which the taking was made.49 The more common practice, how-
ever, is for the landowner to file suit for severance damages
before completion of the long-term highway construction
project.50
Whether the demand for severance damages for highway
quick-takings is tried before or after completion of the project,
these severance damages-and by inference, special benefits-
are calculated as if the project is completed A recent decision
pointed out: "If the defendant [owner] elects to demand full
compensation, including severance damages, prior to completion
of the highway project, he must assume some of the risks or
loss because of the speculative factors involved in an earlier
determination of his severance damages. He nevertheless may
have his demand for severance damages tried prior to comple-
tion of the project, and when he does the burden rests on
him of proving to the degree of certainty required by law what
his severance damages will be upon the completion of the
project."51
On at least one occasion the highway department has
argued that the landowners' appraiser's testimony was incom-
petent, because it estimated the damage to the remainder caused
by a 1961-62 taking as of the date of the taking rather than
as of the date of the 1967 trial. The appraisers had eliminated
from market value any increase produced by general economic
47. LA. R.S. 48:453 (1954).
48. LA. R.S. 48:450 (1954).
49. LA. R.S. 48:451 (1954).
50. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 131 So.2d 600 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
51. State v. Black, 207 So.2d 583, 589 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
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improvements, or any general benefits received following the
highway construction, as of the date of the 1967 trial. In reject-
ing the department's argument, the court stated that the stat-
utory provisions in question were only "intended to specify that
the damage the remainder suffers should be reduced by special
benefits which result to it from the completion of the highway
construction, not to deprive the landowner of compensation for
damages .. . because of any general increase in the value of
the land between the taking and the trial.' '52
If this is the case-if we are to eliminate any increase in
valuation of the subject land due to general appreciation or to
general benefits-then it is suggested, without being fully com-
mitted to the proposition, that before-and-after land values to
determine initial severance damage are determined on the
same basis in general expropriation suits as in highway quick-
takings, although the theoretical time is, in the former, the date
of filing the suit, while in the latter, the date of the trial. In
either case, in effect, we determine the value of the land as of
immediately before and immediately after the taking (or filing
of the suit), since in the highway quick-takings we eliminate
general appreciation factors and are attempting only to isolate
special benefits received as of the date of completion of the
project, as valued at the time of trial. However, in highway
quick-takings tried after completion of the project, an unfair
result of this approach might be to calculate special benefits
on the inflated land-values as of the time of the trial, and deduct
these higher values from severance damages based on lower
acreage-values as of the time of the taking.
To the contrary, the landowner can certainly argue with
irrefutable logic that by the express terms of the statute his
severance damages are to be calculated as of the date of the
trial. So, if the remainder suffers a percentage loss of value,
this severance-caused loss should be calculated upon the higher
land-values at the time of the trial rather than the lower ones
at the time of the taking several years earlier. If, instead of
the general inflation in values since World War II, a deflationary
trend sets in, then (by this reasoning) the landowner's sever-
ance damages should be calculated upon the lower values pre-
vailing at the time of the trial rather than the higher ones at
52. State v. William T. Burton Indus., Inc., 219 So.2d 837, 842 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1969).
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the time of the taking. But this would deprive him of the
damage caused by the loss in market value at the time of the
actual (quick-)taking. Again, if he sells the remainder between
the time of the taking and the time of the trial, should his
damages be calculated as those based upon a theoretical (lower
or higher) market value of the land at the later time of the trial,
instead of upon the actual value of the land at the time of the
taking or of his sale of it?
Until the issue is positively clarified by the jurisprudence,
in highway quick-takings it might well be advisable to value
damages and benefits both as of the time of the taking and as
of the time of the trial, in the event of any great discrepancy
of values between the two dates.
PIPELINE AND PowER LrNE TAKINGS
The law regarding pipeline and power line takings is in a
state of flux, and to attempt to synthesize it is a foreboding
task. Many of its principles were announced in isolated decisions
as dicta or without reasoned reference to statutory guides or
jurisprudential explanations.
One problem aspect of consequential damages arises when
takings for pipelines or high-voltage power lines allegedly affect
the market value not only of tracts or subdivision lots through
which they pass, but also of other lots or parcels. These tracts
fall into three principal categories: (1) those immediately con-
tiguous and owned by the defendant-landowners in the con-
demnation proceedings; (2) those owned by such defendants
but not immediately contiguous and therefore regarded as
separate and independent parcels; and (3) those owned by third
persons not parties to the proceedings, which are regarded as
separate and independent parcels regardless of whether they
are contiguous to the taken tracts.
Whether a contiguous holding is part of the tract taken, or
a separate and independent parcel-such as where parts are
separated by a street or road,58 or where a part is acquired
by the wife of the husband-owner made defendant 54-is some-
times an issue. It will suffice to say that a tract is not regarded
53. Louisiana Ry. & Navigation Co. v. Xavier Realty, Ltd., 115 La. 328,
39 So. 1 (1905); State v. Williams, 131 So.2d 600 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
54. State v. Yawn, 127 So.2d 545 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
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as a separate parcel merely because acquired at a separate time
and divided by an imaginary line from the tract belonging to
the same owner: generally, separateness is a question of fact
under all the circumstances.55
(1) When the land damaged is part of the contiguous tract
across which the pipeline or power line partial taking has been
made, two principal methods of valuation have been approved
by the jurisprudence. Earlier jurisprudence tended to find a
loss of a percentage of the value of the entire remainder-
perhaps five or ten per cent-if the remainder did suffer sever-
ance damage.5 This practice was in spite of a supreme court
decision disapproving this method of computing severance
damages. 7 This latter decision was distinguished as being based
upon the absence of expert testimony in the record to support
the percentage method of computing severance damages."
Many more recent decisions, however, contain expert testi-
mony accepted by the court showing severance damages to only
a strip of property, perhaps 100-500 feet wide, in the subdivision
or tract contiguous to the servitude taken. 9 The reasoning of
these later decisions is that not all of the property of a con-
tiguous tract is adversely affected by a power line or pipeline
taking, but only that property immediately adjacent to it. To
state that a 1,000-acre tract suffers a percentage loss throughout
its whole area in the same manner as does a 5-acre tract would
(so the argument goes) be ridiculous. This seems, however, a
matter upon which expert testimony could differ. For example,
a 1,000-acre tract with best value for industrial purposes might
indeed suffer a percentage loss in the market value of the whole
were it traversed by a 500,000 volt high-power line with giant
"H"-structures. This is a question of fact, and appraisers might
do well to estimate loss of valuation upon both theories when
in the best interests of those who retain them.
(2) When other independent parcels owned by the same
55. State, Dep't of Highways v. Mouledous, 200 So.2d 384 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1967); State v. Williams, 131 So.2d 600 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
56. Interstate Oil Pipeline Co. v. Friedman, 137 So.2d 700 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1962); Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Primeaux, 100 So.2d 917 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1958).
57. Texas Pipeline Co. v. Barbe, 229 La. 191, 219, 85 So.2d 260, 270 (1956).
58. Coastal Transmission Corp. v. Lejeune, 148 So.2d 111, 113 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1962).
59. See, e.g., Michigan Wis. Pipeline Co. v. Sugarland Dev. Corp., 221
So.2d 593 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969); Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Babineaux, 154
So.2d 594 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
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landowner are damaged by the taking, earlier expressions in the
jurisprudence were to the effect that, even in general expropria-
tion proceedings, the defendant landowner could not reconvene
for Such damages but was relegated to an independent suit.6°
These decisions seem to have been based on procedural bars
repealed by the 1960 Code of Civil Procedure,61 as at least one
post-1960 decision has inferentially recognized.62 However, since
the courts might hold this former jurisprudential prohibition
still applicable when part of a landowner's property is taken in
a general expropriation proceeding, he might be well advised
to file a separate suit for damages to independent parcels caused
by the same taking. He might then consolidate it for trial with
the condemnation proceeding in order to avoid the expense and
delay of a subsequent trial which would require a duplication
of much of the expert testimony of the initial condemnation
proceeding. It should be noted that the date for valuing con-
sequential damages to an independent parcel, however, is the
date of the injury sustained by construction of the project,63
not the date of filing the suit, as in expropriation proceedings.64
Until the jurisprudence is clarified, this independent suit might
be dismissed as premature if brought before the damages were
actually sustained through construction of the project.6
60. Louisiana Highway Comm'n v. DeBouchel, 174 La. 968, 142 So. 142
(1932). This decision cites isolated earlier expressions to such effect, id. at
976, 142 So. at 144, in applying the principle.
61. In Louisiana Ry. & Navigation Co. v. Sarpy, 125 La. 388, 51 So. 433
(1910), the court attempts to explain the prohibition on the ground that it
is an improper cumulation since the damages caused to the independent
parcel do not arise until the new project is constructed, while the severance
damages per se are calculated as of the date of the filing of the expropria-
tion proceeding. Since severance damages themselves can be calculated as
if the new "improvement" is constructed, there seems to be no practical
reason why the consequential damages to the independent parcel could not
be similarly calculated. But see note 65 infra. Under the 1960 procedural
reform, the right to cumulate demands is considerably broadened, LA. CODE
Civ. P. arts. 461-65, 647, as is the right of a defendant to assert all actions
against a plaintiff, id. arts. 1061-66.
62. Gulf States Util. Co. v. Comeaux, 182 So.2d 187 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
63. American Tel & Tel. Co. v. Maguire, 219 La. 740, 54 So.2d 4 (1951);
Louisiana Highway Comm'n v. DeBouchel, 174 La. 968, 142 So. 142 (1932).
See Comment, 18 LA. L. REV. 509, 549 (1958).
64. See text accompanying 4346 supra.
65. Because these damages arise only upon construction projects, the
independent suit brought before the damages were sustained might be dis-
missed as premature. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 423; Louisiana Ry. & Navigation
Co. v. Sarpy, 125 La. 388, 51 So. 433 (1910). In the writer's view, however,
recovery of these consequential damages, reasonably possible to estimate in
advance of construction of the new line, is no more premature than the
recovery of severance damages per se before the actual construction of the
project for which the expropriation is made. The single-trial considerations
of judicial efficiency which brought on the 1960 procedural reforms broad-
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In highway "quick-takings," the statute provides only that
the landowner may seek to recover damages to the "remainder"-
i.e., severance damages per se-by his answer in the condemna-
tion proceedings. 6 It has been held that this prevents him from
seeking consequential damages to independent parcels in the
expropriation suit." These consequential damages to separate
parcels do not include "general damages," but are limited to
"special damages," a limitation which applies whether the tract
is owned by a condemnation defendant or by a third person.68
(3) Under the Louisiana Constitution, the physical invasion
of real property or of a real right is not a prerequisite to the
recovery of consequential damages sustained through the taking
of property for a public purpose."9 However, a thin line of deci-
sions has developed to the following effect: consequential dam-
ages to such independent and separate parcels, no part of which
is taken or invaded, "are not recoverable unless the owner
sustains special damages, caused by the public works, which
peculiarly affect his property only and which are not sustained
by the neighborhood generally.'" 0 Thus, in one case where a
new power line caused identical consequential damages in loss
of market value both to tracts partially taken and to nearby
independent parcels, the consequential damages to the separate
parcels were regarded as general damages common to all prop-
erty in the neighborhood and held not recoverable, even though
recovery of similar damages to tracts partially taken was allowed
in the same suit.
71
Buwmx oF PROOF
In determining severance damages and special benefits one
party must sustain the burden of proof-that is, the duty to
ening cumulation and reconventional demands favor permitting the bring-
ing and consolidation of the independent suit with the expropriation suit
which involves much the same issues and evidence. See note 61 supra. The
landowner might, however, lose some consequential damages if completion
of the project is loss delayed and his tract suffers an appreciation of value
in the interval, thus causing an appreciation in the amount of damages
actually sustained.
66. LA. R.S. 48:451, 453 (1954).
67. State, Dep't of Highways v. Mouledous, 199 So.2d 185 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1967).
68. Gulf States Util. Co. v. Comeaux, 182 So.2d 187 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1966).
69. LA. CONST. art. I, § 2; Comment, 19 LA. L. Rzv. 491 (1959).
70. Gulf States Util. Co. v. Comeaux, 182 So.2d 187, 189 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1966).
71. Id. See Comment, 19 LA. L. REV. 491, 500-01 (1959).
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establish the valuation by a preponderance of the evidence. He
loses on the issue unless he bears his burden by sufficient
admissible evidence in the trial. In highway quick-takings,
the burden of proving "damages" is placed by statute upon
the landowner (who incidentally also has the burden of prov-
ing that the market value of the land taken is greater than the
estimated compensation deposited in the court) .7 In general
expropriation cases, there is no statutory regulation, but the
courts have decided that the landowner claiming severance dam-
ages has the burden of proving them.7 8 The landowner has the
burden not only of providing the presence of severance damages
but also their extent and value,7 4 although the appellate courts
in the interest of justice have sometimes remanded cases to the
trial court when convinced that some severance damages were
sustained although the evidence was insufficient as to the
amount.7
5
Once severance damages have been proved, however, the
burden shifts to the taker to prove both the existence and the
quantum of any special benefit received by the property which
is available as an offset. This is true both in highway "quick-
takings" and in general expropriation cases.76 In the absence
of affirmative proof of the amount of special benefits, the claim
to such an offset against severance damages will be dismissed."
RUMINATIONS IN CONCLUSION
In years to come, new trends and developments in the law
of eminent domain will primarily result from legislative action.
Some changes, however, will involve judicial adaptation of
present principles to the conditions of tomorrow. At this point,
it seems appropriate to take a long look down that road.
The law of eminent domain has been and is evolving in the
72. LA. R.S. 48:453 (1954).
73. City of New Orleans v. Giraud, 238 La. 278, 115 So.2d 349 (1959);
Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Barbe, 229 La. 191, 85 So.2d 260 (196); Harrison v.
Louisiana Highway Comm'n, 191 La. 839, 186 So. 354 (1939); Louisiana High-
way Comm'n v. Ferguson, 176 La. 642, 146 So. 319 (1933); Louisiana Ry. &
Navigation Co. v. Sarpy, 125 La. 388, 51 So. 433 (1910).
74. Texas Gas Transmission Corp. v. Broussard, 234 La. 751, 101 So.2d
657 (1958); Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Barbe, 229 La. 191, 85 So.2d 260 (1956).
75. See note 74 supra.
76. City of New Orleans v. Giraud, 238 La. 278, 115 So.2d 349 (1959);
State, Dep't of Highways v. Marks, 188 So.2d 653 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966);
State Dep't of Highways v. Matise, 170 So.2d 709 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).
77. City of New Orleans v. Giraud, 238 La. 278, 115 So.2d 349 (1959).
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light of the changed conditions of modern times. In the early
days of our republic, the "public use" for which property could
be taken against the consent of the owner was restricted. This
concept has expanded to such an extent that in modern times
we see, for instance, urban redevelopment as a sufficient justi-
fication permitting the acquisition of property through eminent
domain for resale to private developers who may utilize it for
their own profit in accomplishing community improvement.
Similarly, the concept of "just compensation" is now under
review, and every indication is that the concept will be expanded
to include items and considerations presently disregarded.78
Again, in earlier times, this empty continent, with its great
stretches of vacant land, permitted the heedless use of our land
resources to accomplish the industrial and transportation objec-
tives of our growing nation. The thrust of the American people
for industrial greatness, international power, and a high individu-
al standard of living demanded a condemnation law that served
these objectives through exploitation of our resources, some-
times at the expense of the owner of property affected, even
though private property is and always has been one of the
sacred values of our free enterprise economy. The conditions
which produced a condemnor-favoring eminent domain law are
now in the process of change. Land, rather than being a bound-
less resource, is perhaps the one material item which our ever-
expanding economy cannot multiply in availability for our
increasing millions of people.
In the re-evaluation.of loss suffered by the individual when
a part of our shrinking private lands owned by him is taken
against his will, one of the first readjustments will probably
allow compensation for what are now termed "incidental" losses
which result directly from the entire or partial taking of the
owner's tract. At the present time, for instance, a business may
be destroyed because of the loss of its site through a taking.
But this loss is held to be a noncompensable, incidental loss
which an owner must bear as a part of the price of being a
member of a civilized society. The cost of relocation when a
78. Without specific citation, the writer will note that some of the
observations are based upon the five following authoritative and stimu-
lating treatments: M. DAKIN & M. KLEIN, EMINENT DOMAIN IN LOUISIANA
passim (1970); Hershman, Comensation-Just and Unjust, 21 Bus. L. 285
(1966); Klein, Eminent Domain: Judicial Response to the Human Disrup-
t4on, 46 J. URBAN LAw 1 (1968); Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness,
80 HARV. L. REv. 1165 (1967); Comment, 67 YALE L. J. 61 (1957).
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business or home is taken is likewise not allowable; nor are
losses due to the diversion of traffic, even when as a result of
a partial taking the new road now passes behind a service
station instead of in front.79 These incidental losses were not
appreciable factors in the historical development of compensa-
tion formulae by the courts. Recovery for them has been ex-
cluded because the courts have been reluctant to encounter
the difficulties of proving both their causation and severity,
and have feared that to allow recovery for incidental dam-
age would make condemnation too expensive-thus retarding
social progress.
The measurement of incidental losses is perhaps not so
speculative as has been claimed. Identical problems have been
resolved by courts in private suits in contract and tort. Ac-
countants and economists may differ with regard to measuring
goodwill; moving and relocation costs may depend on the con-
demnee's peculiar taste and relocation; and it is difficult to
place a monetary value on mental suffering, to evaluate lost
profits, or to repair the condemnee's expectant earnings. How-
ever, in trespass, nuisance, zoning, and wrongful eviction, prop-
erty is seen as a set of legal relationships. If there is inter-
ference with some of these legal relationships, the property
owner is entitled to compensation. There seems to be no tech-
nical or moral reason why the same sort of recoveries should
not be permitted in eminent domain as in these other fields.
As a matter of fact, many courts have been able to measure
these losses in condemnation cases. In England and Canada,
for instance, reasonable recoveries for such injuries have been
granted for many years without undue difficulty. We have
already seen some indications of this trend in recent federal
statutory provisions providing that a taking is conditioned upon
the condemnor's providing or paying for replacement housing
for the people displaced by the taking in addition to the market
value.
While the condemnor may ultimately charge his attorney's
fees to the cost of doing business and be made whole through
the taxpayer or the ultimate consumer, the landowner whose
property is taken must deduct from the "just compensation"
paid to him the cost of his own attorney. The English have long
79. State, Dep't of Highways v. Chesson, 229 So.2d 763 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1969).
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allowed an additional ten per cent of the award for "general
inconvenience" to the condemnee.8 It is not difficult to envisage
a similar American rule which might automatically allow an
additional fixed percentage of the award to the landowner for
the attorney's fees, at least where the condemnor does not prior
to suit tender the amount ultimately awarded by the court.
Some will view with dismay changes such as these, but this
is natural. We dislike the erosion of legal principles which we
have spent years mastering. However, the law stands still no
more than does the life around us. The airplane, that unbeliev-
able wonder of yesterday, stands today as a commonplace along
with television and space travel that were barely dreamed of a
few short decades ago. The law taught in law schools today is
different from the law learned there some twenty years ago.
The law we talk about now will likewise differ, in detail if not
in degree or kind, from the principles applicable to the same
situation twenty years from now.
Rather than waste our time in lamentations and wails of
anguish, let us be glad that we are not members of a stagnant
society, but rather of this bursting boundless visionary nation,
America, ever vigilant in the protection of individual freedom,
including private ownership of property, but at the same time
thrusting in community towards an even higher standard of use
of its economic resources for the national, and indeed, the
world's good.
80. See Comment, 67 YALE L. J. 61, 66 (1957).
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